This dissertation studies dynamic games with constrained planners. In many settings, it is the case that a social planner or a principal wants to achieve an objective depending on private information but is exogenously constrained in the mechanisms they can use, such as the possibility of making transfers, setting up prices, or requesting the full preference profile of agents. Motivating examples include supplying a vaccine that has unknown side effects to potential takers, asking for preference over college programs only even though students may also have preferences over peers, and asking for expert advice. In all these scenarios, though, the planner can leverage the fact that over time information is revealed to improve upon their results: information about the quality of a vaccine is revealed through the usage by others, over time knowledge on the distribution of preferences and abilities may induce students to incorporate peers into their preferences and have a usual mechanism attain stability, and the promise of not implementing outcomes preferred by experts in the future may incentivize them to be honest.
